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One explanation for overpricing on asset markets is a lack of traders’ self-
control. We implement the first experiment to address the causal relationship
between self-control and systematic overpricing on financial markets. Our setup
detects some of the channels through which low individual self-control could
transmit into irrational exuberance in markets. Our data indicate a large direct
effect of reduced self-control on market overpricing. Low self-control traders
report stronger emotions after the market. (JEL G02, G11, G12, D53, D84)
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Even apart from the instability due to speculation, there is the
instability due to the characteristic of human nature that a
large proportion of our positive activities depend on spontaneous
optimism rather than mathematical expectations, whether moral
or hedonistic or economic. Most, probably, of our decisions to do
something positive (...) can only be taken as the result of animal
spirits—a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and
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not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits
multiplied by quantitative probabilities.
—John Maynard Keynes1
Keynes famously saw “animal spirits” at the root of many (financial)
decisions, potentially causing price exaggerations on the aggregate
market level. As is often the case in Keynes’ work, his terms, specifically
the term “animal spirits,” are not well delineated. “Animal spirits”
alludes to an individual’s optimism, instincts, urges, and emotions,
among other things. In this paper we assess the notion that a lack of self-
control may lead to price exaggerations on asset markets, and we analyze
how the lack of self-control as related to animal spirits is associated
with emotions and trading behavior. In psychology, self-control and
willpower are defined as the capacity to override or inhibit undesired
behavioral tendencies, such as impulses, and refrain from acting on them
(Tangney et al., 2004). Self-control is necessary to guard one’s self from
undue optimism, emotional responses, and impulsivity. Furthermore,
self-control is required to adhere to previously made plans.
That self-control is considered relevant for investor success is also
evident from statements of investors and from popular guidebooks on
the psychology of investing. For instance, Warren Buffet emphasizes
that “success in investing doesn’t correlate with I.Q. once you’re above
the level of 25. Once you have ordinary intelligence, what you need
is the temperament to control the urges that get other people into
trouble in investing” (Stone, 1999). Similarly, anecdotal evidence from
rogue traders show that they completely lost their self-control at some
stage. In a study by Lo et al. (2005) involving day traders from an
online training program, participants stated attributes related to self-
control as the most important determinants of trading success.2 In a
similar spirit, Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2011) report distinct differences in
emotion regulation strategies among traders of different experience and
performance levels from qualitative interviews with professional traders.
Therefore, correlational evidence suggests that self-control matters for
trading success on an individual level.
This paper is the first to provide empirical evidence on the causal
effect of a variation in self-control (i.e., low or high self-control) on
trading outcomes.3 The major challenge to overcome is to exogenously
vary the level of an individual’s self-control, to obtain causal inference on
1 (Keynes, 1936, p. 136).
2 Attributes such as persistence, tenacity, perseverance, patience, discipline, planning,
controlling emotions, and (lack of) impulsivity are crucial (Lo et al., 2005, table 3).
3 However, a quickly growing empirical literature studies the effects of self-control on
decision-making in other domains relevant to economists (see, for instance, Beshears et al.
(2015)).
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the impact of self-control on behavior and market outcomes. A first step
is to use the experimental laboratory and to affect the state self-control
levels of traders. Most of the available techniques draw on the concept
of self-control depletion or exhaustion. Our experimental identification
rests on the assumption that self-control is a limited resource that
varies over time by person. Evidence for these two characteristics is
abundant (e.g. Baumeister et al., 1998; Gailliot et al., 2012), although
it also has been questioned lately (Carter and McCullough, 2013).
Validated survey measures for trait self-control exist, but they provide
correlational inference only.
In the spirit of Keynes, we use a laboratory experiment to first
investigate aggregate market outcomes and then extend our analysis to
individual behavior and performance. We use a well-established financial
market setup in the experimental laboratory (Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn,
2015; Kirchler et al., 2012; Noussair and Tucker, 2013; Palan, 2013;
Smith et al., 1988) to investigate whether an exogenous variation in
the level of self-control exhibit by traders leads to mispricing and,
in particular, overpricing. This experimental asset market is known
for its basic tendency to exhibit overpricing; it features a dividend-
bearing asset with decreasing fundamental value. This setup resembles
a large class of assets traded on real asset markets: options, bonds, and
depletable resources all exhibit a value that decreases over time.
To deplete an individual’s self-control before the start of the
market, we employ the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), one of the most
commonly used tasks in psychology experiments for modulating self-
control (Hagger et al., 2010). The test is easily administered; it can
be implemented in an exhausting/depleting version and in an easy
version (i.e., a placebo version); and it allows for additional controls.
The majority of studies that use both survey measures and behavioral
measures of self-control conclude that the effects of state self-control
interventions are qualitatively similar to those of trait self-control levels
(e.g. Schmeichel and Zell, 2007). Hence, even though our experiment
is confined to the laboratory setting and to a variation in state self-
control, it is likely that it extends to situations outside the laboratory
in situations in which trait self-control matters.
A drop in self-control may increase the extent of overpricing on a
market through a variety of channels. One psychological transmission
mechanism runs through an increased influence of the impulsive
decision-making system. A consequence could be that trader behavior
becomes more easily swayed by observing others’ behaviors in the
market (for instance, a more pronounced tendency to momentum
trading). Another behavioral mechanism relates to a heightened
influence of emotions (for instance, the excitement after seeing the
prospect of making more money, or a stronger psychological reward of
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interim gains). Yet another option potentially related to impulsivity
would be a stronger role of biases in decision-making, such as myopia,
limiting the ability to correctly foresee the declining fundamental value
and thus creating histories of overpricing in the market.
Our main finding is a significantly higher level of overpricing in
markets in which traders’ self-control has been depleted, compared to
markets with traders whose self-control has not been depleted. If markets
are populated by both depleted and nondepleted traders, the effect is
similar in size and also highly significant. Apparently, having some self-
control-depleted traders on a market suffices to create the additional
overpricing effect. We also observe that low self-control traders do
not make lower average profits than high self-control traders as the
trading behaviors converge quickly. An initial tendency of low self-
control traders to bid low and early can only be found in the first trading
period. As traders do not earn different profits following the convergence,
low self-control traders are not driven out of the market, delivering an
explanation why such a bias may persist in some markets.
We then investigate potential channels through which reduced self-
control affects outcomes. First, risk attitudes or cognitive abilities of
traders are not affected and therefore cannot mediate the treatment
effect. Second, self-control-depleted subjects report stronger emotions
that are commonly associated with overpricing in asset markets. Third,
we find that cognitive abilities lose their predictive power for earnings
when subjects are low in self-control. Together, these findings suggest
that self-control-depleted traders become more reliant on heuristics, are
much more emotion driven, and rely less on their cognitive skills to find
optimal trading strategies.
1. Related Literature
Our literature overview focuses on two aspects of the economics
and psychology literature most relevant for our study: self-control
and experimental asset markets. As already stated, self-control and
willpower are defined as the capacity to override or inhibit undesired
behavioral tendencies, such as impulses, and refrain from acting
on impulses. Different theoretical approaches in psychology and in
economics consider self-control and potential problems with self-control.
First, self-control can be related to dual-systems perspectives of
decision-making in a straightforward way. As outlined by Kahneman
(2011), these perspectives share the general assumption that structurally
different systems of information processing underlie the production
of impulsive, largely automatic forms of behavior, on the one hand
(system 1), and deliberate, largely controlled forms of behavior, on
4
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the other hand (system 2). System 2 is effortful and requires self-
control resources.4 Thus, if resources are low, reflective operations may
be impaired, leading to a dominance of impulsive reactions that could
be in conflict with objective reasoning. From this perspective, reducing
self-control can be interpreted as increasing the role of the (impulsive)
system 1 in decision-making (Hofmann et al., 2009).
Second, and very much related to dual-system perspectives,
economists have used dual-self models of impulse control (see, for
instance, Thaler and Shefrin (1981) and Fudenberg and Levine (2006))
to describe self-control problems. These models study the interaction
of two selves, a rational (long-term) and an impulsive (short-term) self.
Such models can account for time-inconsistent behavior (for instance,
in connection with quasi-hyperbolic discounting) and for the fact that
cognitive load makes temptations more difficult to resist.
Third, willpower as a depletable resource has been modeled directly
in economics. Ozdenoren et al. (2012) look at a consumption smoothing
model that views willpower as a depletable resource, and Masatlioglu
et al. (2011) consider lottery choices.
Is there empirical evidence for self-control or willpower to be indeed
limited or depletable resources? Many researchers in psychology have
shown that exerting self-control consumes energy and consequently
diminishes the available resources for other acts that require self-
control.5 Self-control can involve cognitive control, affective control, or
both (Hagger et al., 2010). Self-control regenerates through rest, can
be trained, and can differ between people (Baumeister et al., 1998;
Muraven, 2010; Muraven and Baumeister, 2000; Muraven et al., 1999;
Tangney et al., 2004).
Our experimental identification relies on self-control depletion. We
reduce self-control by exposing experimental participants to a self-
control-demanding task before the main task (known as the dual task
paradigm). Such setups have been used in other domains in economics,
mainly in the context of individual decision-making. For example,
the consequences of self-control variations in decision-making under
risk have been studied. Several papers report increased risk aversion
following self-control depletion (Kostek and Ashrafioun, 2014; Unger and
Stahlberg, 2011). However, a number of studies also reveal an increase
in risk-taking following similar manipulations (Bruyneel et al., 2009;
4 Note that the division of system 1 as automatic (or unconscious decision-making) and
system 2 as controlled (or conscious decision-making) describes tendencies; both automatic
and controlled processes are involved in exerting self-control and in giving in to temptation,
respectively (cf. Kotabe and Hofmann, 2015).
5 For recent overviews about the ongoing discussion in psychology and models of the
underlying processes involved in self-control, see Inzlicht and Schmeichel (2012) and
Kotabe and Hofmann (2015).
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Freeman and Muraven, 2010; Friehe and Schildberg-Ho¨risch, 2017). Both
Stojic´ et al. (2013) and Gerhardt et al. (2017) find no significant effect
of self-control manipulations on risk preferences elicited from choice
lists. Bucciol et al. (2011, 2013) show in field experiments with children
and adults that self-control depletion leads to reduced productivity in
subsequent tasks. Buckert et al. (2017) report that the Stroop task
reduces prices in a Cournot game, and De Haan and Van Veldhuizen
(2015) find no effect of a repeated Stroop task on the performance in
an array of tasks in which framing effects, such as anchoring effects and
the attraction effect, are typically observed.
Recently, researchers have looked at the effects of varying levels of self-
control on other-regarding preferences. Achtziger et al. (2016) report
a strong but heterogeneous impact of reduced self-control on offers
and accepting behavior in ultimatum games, presumably depending on
what an individual’s more automatic reactions are. In a similar vein,
Achtziger et al. (2015) provide evidence for reduced dictator giving after
a reduction in self-control.6
Existing studies also suggest a relationship between self-control and
financial decision-making. However, we are not aware of experimental
studies in this context. Using survey evidence, Ameriks et al. (2003,
2007) consider the connection between wealth accumulation and trait
self-control in a sample of highly educated U.S. households. Ameriks
et al. (2003) attribute differences in savings among households to
differing “propensities to plan,” that is, different individual costs of
exerting self-control. Ameriks et al. (2007) use the difference between
planned behavior and expected behavior in a hypothetical scenario as
a measure for self-control problems. They find a positive correlation
between better self-control and wealth accumulation for liquid assets, in
particular. Gathergood (2012) conducts a similar study in the United
Kingdom with a representative sample. He reports a positive association
between lower levels of self-control and consumer overindebtedness.
Our asset market is based on the seminal paper by Smith et al. (1988),
who were the first to observe significant overpricing in an experimental
double auction market. Many studies have followed up on these early
findings.7 Trader inexperience and confusion have been considered as
one of the aggravating factors of overpricing (Dufwenberg et al., 2005;
Kirchler et al., 2012), and Bosch-Rosa et al. (2018), for example, show
that grouping traders by cognitive skills leads to increased overpricing
for groups with low cognitive sophistication. Nadler et al. (2017) provide
6 Martinsson et al. (2014) indirectly analyze the relationship between self-control and
prosociality, but their findings are also in line with the idea that prosocial behavior requires
self-control. Kocher et al. (2017) provide a similar result.
7 See Noussair and Tucker (2013) and Palan (2013) for recent surveys.
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evidence that giving testosterone to a group of male participants
significantly increases prices, and Petersen and Spickers (2015) find that
inducing stress decreases overpricing. In line with our findings, Dickinson
et al. (2017) report that sleepy traders generate more overpricing. They
interpret these findings as a result of an inhibition of cognitive functions
and a reduced ability to anticipate others’ actions, which is somewhat
different from—though loosely related to—exerting self-control, that is,
the capacity to override undesired behavioral tendencies.
Since emotion regulation is correlated with self-control (Tice and
Bratslavsky, 2000), the influence of emotions on prices in asset markets
is also relevant to our research question: Andrade et al. (2016) find
that inducing excitement before trading triggers overpricing in asset
markets stronger in magnitude and higher in amplitude than other
emotions and a neutral condition. In a similar study, Lahav and Meer
(2012) show that inducing positive mood leads to higher deviations from
fundamental values and thus more overpricing. The role of emotions in
experimental asset markets also has been evaluated using self-reported
emotions on Likert scales (Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo, 2011) and face
reading software (Breaban and Noussair, 2018), instead of inducing
specific emotions exogenously. Results from these experiments indicate
that excitement and a positive emotional state before market opening
are correlated with increased prices relative to fundamental values.
Moreover, fear at the opening of the market is correlated with lower
price levels.
2. Experimental Design
The experiment consisted of four independent main parts: (1)
instructions and dry runs of the asset market without monetary
consequences and without the possibility to build reputation for the
parts to come; (2) the main treatment variation in self-control, the
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) in two treatment versions; (3) elicitation of
risk attitudes and cognitive abilities, both incentivized; and (4) a fully
incentivized experimental asset market.
Our identification of the effects induced by a variation in self-control in
market prices relies on the comparison of behavior in markets following
two different versions of the Stroop task. A tough version lowered self-
control, whereas a placebo version should have left self-control largely
unaffected. We implemented a condition in which all market participants
were subjected to the tough version of the Stroop task (henceforth
LOWSC for low self-control), a condition in which all participants were
subjected to the placebo version (henceforth HIGHSC for high self-
control), and a condition in which half of the participants were randomly
assigned to the tough and the placebo versions, respectively (henceforth
7
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Figure 1
Treatment differences in the Stroop task
MIXED to denote the mixed nature of the market). In the MIXED
condition, we will refer to traders facing the tough version of the Stroop
task as MIXLO and to those facing the placebo version of the Stroop
task as MIXHI, to avoid confusion with the pure treatments. Except for
this treatment variation in part (2), the three experimental conditions
were identical in all other parts.
The Stroop task followed a simple protocol: participants were
instructed to correctly solve as many problems as possible within 5
minutes. The left-hand side of Figure 1 displays an example of this
problem. The task was to select the color of the font the word was
printed in. A selection of six color buttons, always the same and in the
same order, was given on the bottom right of the screen, and subjects
were instructed to click on the correct one. As soon as they made a
selection, the next word-color combination appeared. Consecutive word-
color combinations always differed from each other. The difficulty of
this task was that the words always described one of the six colors;
the incongruence between the color of the word and the word itself
caused a cognitive conflict, since reading the word was the dominant
cue. Common explanations for the conflict are automaticity of reading
the word or relatively faster processing of reading than color perception
(MacLeod, 1991). The conflict had to be resolved, and resolution
required self-control. Applying this effort depleted self-control, and left
participants with lower levels of willpower and/or self-control after
completing the 5-minute task.
The Stroop task is one of the most commonly applied methods to
deplete self-control (Hagger et al., 2010). It can be easily implemented in
a computer laboratory, is straightforward to explain, requires only basic
literacy skills, and generates additional data on the number of correctly
solved problems and the number of mistakes. The difference between
the Stroop task in LOWSC/MIXLO and HIGHSC/MIXHI was the
frequency with which a conflicting word-color combination occurred.8
8 The right-hand side of Figure 1 shows an example of congruence between font color and
a word, as we use it in the placebo Stroop task in HIGHSC/MIXHI.
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All screens in LOWSC/MIXLO exhibited such a conflict, whereas, in
HIGHSC/MIXHI, only every 70th screen did. Experimental participants
did not receive any information on the frequency of such a conflict, and
the instructions for the two versions of the task were identical. By having
an occasional word-color incongruence in HIGHSC/MIXHI we were able
to ensure that subjects took the task seriously. If anything, our setup
reduced the potential treatment difference, because in HIGHSC/MIXHI
some self-control depletion might still have taken place, making the
potential result of a significant difference between the two conditions
more difficult to obtain.
We decided to provide participants with a flat payment of e3.00 for
the Stroop task, to signal that we were interested in their performance.
We did not use a piece rate or any other competitive payment scheme
because it might have created different wealth levels after the treatment
variation, and wealth differences might have been correlated with the
treatment. Hence, treatment differences might have potentially been
confounded by wealth effects.9 After participants completed the 5-
minute task, we asked them how difficult they perceived the task to
be on a six-point Likert scale.
Self-control depletion can influence several relevant variables for
the subsequent experimental asset market. We control for two
mechanisms directly: cognitive ability and risk attitudes.10 Eliciting
control variables took place after the self-control manipulation but
before the experimental asset market for two reasons: First, if these
measures had followed the asset market, there might have been spillover
effects due to experiences during the asset market, and second, the
effect of our self-control manipulation might have worn off since the
asset market part of the experiment lasted a considerable amount of
time during which self-control could start to regenerate (Muraven and
Baumeister, 2000). To avoid having the self-control variation wear off
before the asset market interaction started, we required the control
variables measurement not to take much time. Two tasks that fitted
this requirement were the cognitive reflection test (CRT) for measuring
individual cognitive abilities (Frederick, 2005) and a simple multiple
price list lottery design for eliciting individual risk attitudes (Dohmen
et al., 2011).
9 Achtziger et al. (2015) find no differences in depletion effects between flat payments and
incentivized versions of a related self-control manipulation. We are confident that subjects
took the task seriously; no one answered fewer than 110 items. Most of our subjects
answered many more. For details, see Section A.3.
10 For evidence of potential effects of self-control depletion on complex thinking, see
Schmeichel et al. (2003).
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First, our subjects answered the three questions of the standard CRT.
It is well known that CRT responses are correlated with more time-
consuming measures of cognitive ability and risk and time preferences
(Frederick, 2005) and with decisions in a wide array of experimental
tasks, such as entries in p-beauty contests (Bran˜as-Garza et al., 2012)
and performance in heuristics-and-biases tasks (Toplak et al., 2011).
Furthermore, Corgnet et al. (2014) and Noussair et al. (2016) find that
the CRT is a good predictor of individual trader’s profits in asset market
experiments.11 Subjects were paid e0.5 for every correct answer but did
not learn their CRT results—and thus earnings—until the end of the
experiment.
Second, we elicited individual certainty equivalents (CE) for a lottery
using a multiple price list as a measure for individual risk attitudes.
Differences in risk attitudes can be a rational reason for trade (Smith
et al., 1988) and might explain initial underpricing of assets in the
market, thus sparking later price increases and overpricing (Miller,
2002; Porter and Smith, 1995). Furthermore, Fellner and Maciejovsky
(2007) find that more risk-averse individuals trade less frequently. On
a single computer screen, our experimental participants had to choose
10 times between a lottery that paid either e0.20 or e4.20 with equal
probability and increasing certain amounts of money that were equally
spaced between the two outcomes of the lottery. Subjects could switch
at most once from the lottery to the certain amounts. At the end of the
experiment, the computer randomly picked one of the 10 decisions of
each individual as payoff relevant and implemented the preferred option,
potentially simulating the lottery outcome.
Immediately after risk elicitation the main part of the experiment,
the asset market, opened. The asset market featured a dividend-bearing
asset with decreasing fundamental value over 10 trading periods (lasting
120 seconds each) in a continuous double-auction market design with 10
traders and with open order books, following Kirchler et al. (2012).12
This is a simplified version of the markets in Smith et al. (1988). Before
the first trading period, five subjects in a given market received 1000
experimental points in cash and 60 assets, and the other five received
3000 points in cash and 20 assets as their initial endowment. Assignment
to the two initial asset allocations was random.
During each trading period, traders could post bids and asks as well as
accept open bids and asks. Partially executed bids and asks continued to
be listed with their residual quantities and inactive orders remain in the
11 The CRT is a measure of cognitive ability and thinking disposition (Toplak et al., 2011).
Therefore, we strictly regard the CRT as a measure of cognitive skills.
12 Section A.7.1 provides the experimental instructions, including a screenshot and a
description of the trading screen.
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books until the end of the current period. At the end of every period,
the asset paid a dividend of either 10 or 0 experimental points with
equal probability. The dividend payment was added to each trader’s
cash holdings. Assets had no remaining value after the last dividend
payment; that is, they displayed a declining (expected) fundamental
value. This design feature was explicitly stated and highlighted in the
instructions. To make things clear, the instructions provided a detailed
table with the sum of remaining expected dividend payments per unit
of the asset at any point in time. Assets and cash were carried from
period to period. Short selling and borrowing experimental points were
not allowed. After every period, the average trading price as well as the
realizations of the current and all past dividends were displayed on a
separate feedback screen. At the end of the 10 periods, experimental
points were converted into euros, using an initially announced exchange
rate of 500 points = e1.00.
In 8 of the 12 MIXED markets, we added several questions to the
experimental questionnaires dealing with participants’ emotions. We
were interested whether our variation of self-control had taken effect via
changes in emotional states. To reduce experimenter demand effects—
and as is common in experiments analyzing emotions—we presented
subjects with several emotions, of which some were not relevant at all to
our question of interest. In four of the eight sessions, we asked subjects
about their emotions not only after the 10 trading periods but also
immediately after the first trading period.
At the end of the experiment, subjects learned about their payoffs
from all parts of the experiment. We asked them to complete a short
questionnaire concerning demographics and background data. We also
asked participants how tired they felt after the experiment and how
difficult they have perceived decisions to be over the course of the entire
experiment on a 6-point Likert scale. Then all earnings were paid out in
private, and the subjects were dismissed from the laboratory.
The sessions for the treatment HIGHSC and LOWSC were conducted
in October 2013. Participants (160) took part in 10 experimental
sessions: four with one market and six with two markets. Hence,
we obtained 16 independent observations, 8 for each condition. We
conducted a total of 12 sessions with 24 markets and 240 subjects of the
MIXED treatment in April 2014, November 2015, and October 2017
(four sessions each). In all, 400 subjects participated in 40 markets.
The experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and
recruitment was performed with the help of ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
Experimental sessions lasted for about 90 minutes, and participants
earned e18.27 on average. We only invited students who had never
participated in an asset market experiment before. We also excluded
11
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students potentially familiar with the CRT or the Stroop task.13 Prior
to the start of the experiment, subjects received written instructions for
all parts of the experiment. These were read aloud to ensure common
knowledge. Remaining questions were answered in private.
3. Experimental Results
3.1 Manipulation check
The data suggest that our treatment manipulation was successful:
First, during the Stroop task, participants attempted fewer problems,
achieved fewer correctly solved problems, and made more mistakes in
the LOWSC/MIXLO condition than in the HIGHSC/MIXHI condition
(all Mann-Whitney tests p<.01; N=400).14 Participants perceived the
Stroop task as significantly more demanding in the LOWSC/MIXLO
condition than in the HIGHSC/MIXHI condition (Mann-Whitney test
p<.01; N=400). Finally, we do not find any differences in background
characteristics such as field (p= .695; N=400) and year of study (p=
.358; N=400), age (p= .573; N=400) and gender (p= .679; N=400)
between our two treatments (Mann-Whitney tests and Pearson’s χ2 test
for field of study), suggesting that random assignment to treatments was
successful.
3.2 Definitions and measures
To calculate mean prices, one can use either an adjustment that takes
trading volumes into account (henceforth: volume-adjusted prices) or
an adjustment that takes the number of trades into account (henceforth
trade-adjusted prices). The former is an average price per asset, whereas
the latter is an average price per trade. Our results remain unaffected by
the choice of adjustment; in line with the literature, we mainly display
results based on volume-adjusted prices in the following.
To quantify the tendency of markets to exhibit irrational exuberance,
we compare trading prices with the fundamental value of the asset. In
the following we adopt the approach of Sto¨ckl et al. (2010) and assess the
market price developments using relative absolute deviation (RAD) (in
Equation (1)) and relative deviation (RD) (in Equation (2)) as measures
for general mispricing and overpricing, respectively.
RAD=
1
T
T∑
t=1
|Pt−FVt|
F¯ V
(1)
13 Of our 400 subjects, five suffer from some form of dyschromatopsia, a vision impairment
that makes seeing colors difficult. We queried participants about the disorder in the post-
experimental questionnaire, to make sure that it is not a common phenomenon.
14 Section A.3 provides detailed distributions for these variables. All tests reported in this
paper are two-sided unless stated otherwise.
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RD=
1
T
T∑
t=1
Pt−FVt
F¯ V
(2)
Pt is the volume-adjusted mean price in period t, FVt is the
fundamental value of the asset in period t, and F¯ V denotes the average
fundamental value of the asset over all periods.
RAD is constructed as the ratio of the average absolute difference
of mean market price and fundamental value, relative to the average
fundamental value of the asset. RD is the ratio of the average difference
between mean market price and fundamental value, relative to the
average fundamental value. The difference between the two measures
is how the difference between mean market price and fundamental
value enters the calculation: for RAD, the difference enters in absolute
terms, thus all deviations from the fundamental value—overpricing
and underpricing—increase RAD, making RAD a measure of average
mispricing. For RD the wedge between market price and fundamental
value retains its sign, thus periods with overpricing and underpricing
can cancel each other out. Hence, RD provides the dominant direction
of mispricing, making it, in effect, a measure of average overpricing.
Both measures have straightforward interpretations: a RAD of 0.1
means that prices are on average 10% off the fundamental value,
while a RD of 0.1 indicates that prices are on average 10% above the
fundamental value. Both measures are independent of the number of
periods and the fundamental value.
3.3 Aggregate price development
Figure 2 shows how average market prices in LOWSC and HIGHSC
evolve over the 10 trading periods. In both conditions, average market
prices start out at a similar level, displaying a moderate level of
underpricing. However, from the third period onwards, average prices
in both conditions exceed the fundamental value. Eventually, average
market prices sharply drop, but not below the fundamental value again.
The most conservative comparisons between these two treatments
are based on market averages over all traders and over all 10 periods.
This is the approach we apply for all nonparametric tests regarding
aggregate market outcomes. These averages are statistically independent
in the strict sense, and test statistics are based on eight observations for
each of the two treatments. Thereby, we also eliminate all temporal
correlation to make sure that our standard errors are not biased by
autoregressive properties of the data. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test
confirms the impression from eyeballing, that is, that market prices
in both conditions are significantly different from the fundamental
13
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Figure 2
Mean (volume-adjusted) trading prices in the two treatments
value (HIGHSC : p= .0929, LOWSC : p= .0173; N=8).15 Figure 2
suggests more pronounced overpricing in the LOWSC condition than
in HIGHSC, which is confirmed by a Mann-Whitney test (HIGHSC :
R¯D=0.1885, LOWSC : R¯D=0.4990; p= .0742; N=16).16 A comparison
of RD tells us that while in HIGHSC overpricing is on average 19%, in
LOWSC prices exceed the fundamental value by almost 50%. Thus,
trade among individuals with low self-control leads to overpricing which
is more than twice as high as in the baseline HIGHSC.
Furthermore markets in the LOWSC condition exhibit higher levels of
mispricing (HIGHSC : ¯RAD=0.3253, LOWSC : ¯RAD=0.5890; Mann-
Whitney test: p= .0460; N=16). According to RAD, prices in the
HIGHSC condition deviate by about 33% from the fundamental value,
whereas they deviate by about 59% from the fundamental value in the
LOWSC condition.
Figure 3 displays the price evolution of single markets in the two
conditions. Price evolution in the markets exhibits a high degree of path
dependence and endogeneity and a lot of heterogeneity among markets
in the same condition. Therefore, finding a significant difference between
the two conditions for the most conservative test in terms of statistical
independence is the more striking. The left panel represents the markets
15 We use p<.1 as the lowest significance level. The choice of this significance level is common
practice in economics and finance and only matters for our most conservative comparisons
with very few observations. In all regression outputs, relevant coefficients always will be
significant at the p<.05 level or better.
16 Both measures are significantly different from zero for both conditions.
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Figure 3
Evolution of individual market prices in HIGHSC and LOWSC
from the HIGHSC condition, whereas the right panel shows the LOWSC
markets. Price paths in HIGHSC markets often follow a rather flat or
declining development, while in LOWSC a number of markets display
a hump-shaped price evolution that initially increases and peaks in
later trading periods. The emergence of overpricing oftentimes can be
attributed to constant prices despite decreasing fundamental values
(Huber and Kirchler, 2012; Kirchler et al., 2012); a description that
fits price paths in our HIGHSC markets better than those in LOWSC
markets.17
Figure 4 shows the evolution of average trading prices in all three
treatments. Interestingly, the effect of reduced self-control on mispricing
and overpricing does not seem to be changed if only part of the
trader population is self-control depleted. Both LOWSC and MIXED
on average display more overpricing than HIGHSC. For MIXED we
observe an average RAD of 0.529 and an average RD of 0.398. A Mann-
Whitney test confirms that the mispricing measure RAD in MIXED
is significantly different from HIGHSC (p= .056; N=32) but cannot
17 Section A.1 shows a comparison of overpricing measures across treatments for each
period separately. Overpricing in LOWSC significantly exceeds overpricing in HIGHSC
in periods 6–9.
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Figure 4
Trading price evolution including MIXED
be statistically distinguished from LOWSC (p= .5716; N=32). This
result also holds for our overpricing measure: RD in MIXED differs
significantly from HIGHSC (p= .0982; N=32), but not from LOWSC
(p= .4334; N=32).18
Figure 5 illustrates the evolution of mean trading prices for the
24 individual markets in the MIXED condition. Qualitatively, we get
similar results as in LOWSC. That is, in some of these markets,
price development is hump shaped: it initially increases and peaks in
some intermediate period. Thus, already the presence of a moderate
share of traders with depleted self-control is sufficient to reproduce the
excess overpricing we observed when all traders’ self-control levels were
depleted. This seems relevant as in reality we do not expect all traders,
but only a moderate share, to be low in self-control.
3.4 Potential transmission mechanisms of the treatment
effect
Having established a significant treatment effect, the next step is to
look at potential channels via which self-control variations could have
affected market outcomes. Detailed descriptive results on the variables
considered in this section can be found in Section A.4ff.
3.4.1 Cognitive abilities and risk attitudes. Self-control-depleted
participants might not be willing to expend as much energy and thus
18 The results of these comparisons also hold when looking at quantity- or trade-adjusted
mean prices.
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Figure 5
Price evolution in individual markets in MIXED
provide the (wrong) intuitive answers in the CRT. The average number
of correct answers in the CRT was 1.05 in HIGHSC and 1.14 in
LOWSC. The difference in CRT scores between the two conditions is not
significant according to a Mann-Whitney test (p= .7223; N=160). We
conclude that the Stroop task did not affect our incentivized version of
the CRT.19 Furthermore, risk attitudes might be affected by self-control.
The average certainty equivalent we elicited is close to the lottery’s
expected value: 2.2 in HIGHSC and 2.15 in LOWSC. Like the literature
exploring the effect of reduced self-control on risk attitude that has come
to inconclusive results (e.g. Bruyneel et al., 2009; Gerhardt et al., 2017;
Unger and Stahlberg, 2011), we also find no significant effect (Mann-
Whitney test, p= .4083; N=160) of our treatment variation on risk
attitudes as measured by the multiple price list certainty equivalent
elicitation.20
Although our control variables seem unaffected by our treatment, they
could still possess explanatory power for the difference in overpricing
that we observe. Therefore, we run regressions and include controls as
independent variables. To avoid endogeneity problems across trading
periods and between subjects, respectively, we aggregate overpricing
measures over all 10 periods on the individual level and use robust
19 When we include the observations from the MIXED conditions, the CRT scores of the
two groups become 1.08 and 1.18, respectively, with p= .3911 and N=400 from a Mann-
Whitney test.
20 Including observations from the MIXED conditions does not provide significant differences
between the two groups either (p= .9134; N=400).
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standard errors clustered at the market level. We do this separately
for sales and purchases, since selling above fundamental value results
in an expected profit, while buying above fundamental value results
in an expected loss. We define measures for individual overpricing for
purchases and sales, which we call IndRDpurchases and IndRDsales,
respectively. Similar to the definition of the RD measure, they are
defined as the percentage of buying (selling) prices exceeding the asset’s
fundamental value pooled over all periods, but for each subject’s buying
(selling) activity separately instead of at the market level as before.
We report results for IndRDpurchases as the dependent variable in the
regressions in Table 1. In Tables A.2 and A.3 of Section A.2, we provide
robustness checks for our chosen approach for sales and both aggregated
sales and purchases.
In all four models we are interested in the effect of the explanatory
variables on IndRDpurchases, our measure of an individual’s overpricing
tendency. Throughout all specifications, we observe a significant
treatment effect: Being in LOWSC increases an individual’s propensity
to buy at excessive prices. In Specification 2, our measure of risk attitude
is not significant, but if we also include interactions with our treatments
in Specifications 3 and 4, relative risk seeking is correlated with lower
individual overpricing when self-control is reduced. Performance on
the CRT has the expected effect of reducing the tendency of buying
at prices above fundamental value in all specifications where it is
included, although not always statistically significant, and its effect does
not significantly differ between participants in LOWSC and HIGHSC
markets.21 Hence, introducing measures for risk aversion and cognitive
skills and their interactions with our treatments do not reduce the size
or significance of the treatment coefficient. We conclude that neither
changes in cognitive skills nor in risk preferences can explain our main
result of excess overpricing after self-control depletion.
3.4.2 Trading activity. An additional channel through which our
results could be explained is changes in trading activity, that is, the
number of traded shares per trading period. People low in self-control
have been reported to become more passive (Baumeister et al., 1998,
Experiment 4). But “passiveness” may not necessarily equal lower
trading frequencies. The authors of that paper define “passive” as
following usual action patterns without deliberation, while they define
“active” as the result of cognitive effort to determine the best action
to be chosen. As an example, they describe a married couple deciding
21 From all regressions including this variable, we exclude subjects who were familiar with
the CRT, because such knowledge might have inflated correct CRT responses and thus
obfuscate any effects of CRT scores. The regression results are qualitatively very similar
when including these subjects.
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Table 1
Determinants of individual RD based on purchases
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IndRDpurchases
LOWSC 0.369** 0.390** 0.816*** 0.843***
(0.136) (0.134) (0.131) (0.125)
CRT -0.0708* -0.0952 -0.0912
(0.0392) (0.0558) (0.0547)
CE -0.0188 0.0684 0.0719
(0.0459) (0.0441) (0.0455)
CRT × LOWSC 0.0612 0.0628
(0.0821) (0.0831)
CE × LOWSC -0.224*** -0.237***
(0.0712) (0.0709)
Female 0.0666
(0.0690)
Constant 0.084 0.194 0.0255 -0.0353
(0.082) (0.120) (0.0597) (0.0682)
Observations 160 110 110 110
R2 .227 .307 .364 .370
This table provides results from an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, where the
dependent variable is individual relative deviation (IndRD) for purchases, an individual
equivalent to market-level relative deviation (RD) restricted to purchases only. LOWSC
is a dummy that equals 1 stands for LOWSC and 0 for HIGHSC. CE is an individual’s
certainty equivalent. CRT denotes the number of correct answers on the CRT. Subjects
who indicated they knew one or more of the CRT questions before are excluded from
Columns 2 through 4. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the
market level in parentheses. *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1.
whether to go to sleep. While the decision to go to bed could be
considered “active” in terms of movement, it also may be “passive”
if the couple does so as part of a routine.
We think that “passiveness” in our experiment can in principle be
understood in the same way. If being passive simply means to act
less deliberately and follow more common heuristics, it could be that
traders low in self-control trade more and earlier, as they might rely
on a preconception of the notion of a trader as frequently buying and
selling stocks. Then higher trading activity might translate into more
19
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Figure 6
Evolution of average shares traded per trader by condition
liquid markets (Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1995; Chordia et al.,
2001; Stoll, 1978), which, in turn, can drive overpricing in experimental
markets (Kirchler et al., 2012). Alternatively, if “passiveness” meant
lower trading activity, under certain circumstances we might also expect
a positive effect of trading activity on prices as trading at excessive prices
by only a small set of traders might be enough to drive aggregate price
evolution.
Thus, we compare the number of shares traded in the two conditions.
Figure 6 illustrates the evolution of average shares traded per period.
Traders in HIGHSC traded slightly more overall: whereas the average
trader traded 13.02 shares per period in HIGHSC, only 11.39 shares
changed hands on average per trader in each period in LOWSC.
However, according to a Mann-Whitney test, the amounts traded
between the two conditions are not significantly different (p=0.3446;
N=16).22
Therefore, we turn to our MIXED condition. We investigate if we can
find differences in trading behavior when both treated and untreated
traders interact in the same market. However, when analyzing trading
behavior, distinguishing cause and effect is particularly difficult, as most
of the trading behavior may be endogenous due to interactions across
traders. A particular deviation in behavior by some traders in the
early phases of a market might shift behavior of other (nondepleted)
traders. Therefore, we start by focusing on the first trading period,
22 Additional regression analysis in Table A.4 of Section A.2 reinforces this conclusion.
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Table 2
First period differences in trading behavior
Group Mean
MIXHI MIXLO p-value
pbid 35.927 28.539 .044**
pask 59.303 53.097 .753
qbid 14.511 17.076 .119
qask 12.940 13.813 .627
timebid 60.732 47.318 .044**
timeask 51.410 51.194 .954
firsttimebid 52.978 41.458 .108
firsttimeask 34.176 36.358 .690
Variables starting with a p denote prices and variables starting with q denote quantities.
Time variables refer to the time passed in the current period, and, thus, lower values
indicate quicker actions. bid and ask refer to posted bids and asks. p-values are from a
Wilcoxon signed-rank test with data collapsed on market and treatment level. *** p<.01;
** p<.05; * p<.1.
where dependencies are less relevant than in later periods. Table 2
compares several variables concerning trading activity between MIXLO
and MIXHI traders.
According to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, MIXLO traders make
significantly lower bids initially (p= .044; N=22) and post these bids
earlier than their nondepleted peers (p= .044; N=22). They are also
quicker in posting their first bid at the beginning of the period, but
this test misses conventional significance levels (p= .108; N=22). After
period one, these differences vanish, suggesting that nondepleted traders
start imitating the behavior of self-control-depleted traders.23 Imitation
seems to arise as markets subsequently follow the trajectory observed
in LOWSC markets, rather than that of HIGHSC markets, suggesting
that all traders eventually behave like those in our LOWSC treatment.
There exist several possibilities why MIXHI traders may start imitating
the behavior of MIXLO traders. Remember that traders do not know
that different levels of self-control are present in traders in the market.
For example, they might expect those who bid early to have a better
understanding of the optimal strategies, or they could simply enjoy the
faster pace of the market and therefore adjust. In our setting, it is
impossible to pinpoint the motivation and the beliefs of traders, but
we think that this would be an interesting starting point for future
research.
23 Results for period two, which are reported in Table A.8, indicate that these initial trading
differences disappear.
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We conclude our analysis of trading behavior by noting that while
overall trading activity is not increased, we still observe initial differences
in posting bids. This behavior seems in line with Baumeister et al.’s
definition of “passiveness,” that is, an automatism, without much active,
effortful, and time-consuming deliberation. In contrast, thinking more
deeply about the underlying dividend process and strategies to act
optimally in the market against other traders would require more
cognitive effort and thus potentially more time. Therefore, posting bids
early can be seen as a manifestation of less deliberate choices.
3.5 Profits
On average, MIXLO traders earned e 8.23, and MIXHI traders earned
e 7.77 in the experimental asset market, a difference that is not
significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p= .2531; N=24).24 We consider
this as evidence that inhibited self-control affects overpricing, but that
depleted traders are not necessarily driven out of the market. While
it initially may seem as a puzzle that MIXLO traders do not suffer
consequences, it is very well in line with our findings from the previous
section on trading activity. Because trading behavior differs significantly
only during the first period and converges afterwards, traders eventually
become indistinguishable in their behavior. With similar behavior and
profits, low self-control traders have shifted markets onto different
price trajectories. This finding may carry potential implications for real
markets, as markets attracting many inexperienced traders may lead
these traders to imitate other, possibly self-control-depleted traders. The
resultant lack of differences in profits may thus be a reason behavioral
biases persist in real markets (Barberis and Thaler, 2003).
Previous research has furthermore shown that CRT scores correlate
positively with individual participants’ profits in similar experiments
(Corgnet et al., 2014; Noussair et al., 2016). Toplak et al. (2011) find that
CRT scores are correlated with measures of cognitive ability, thinking
disposition and executive functioning. Thus, we can interpret the CRT
score as a measure of cognitive control. To check whether the effect of
CRT performance on profits is similar here, we ran additional regressions
which we report in Table 3. Note that we excluded participants who had
indicated at the end of the experiment that they had already known at
least one of the CRT questions. The knowledge of CRT questions before
the experiment might have inflated correct CRT responses and thus
obfuscate any interaction effects between treatment and CRT scores.25
24 Testing profits at the market level constitutes the most conservative test. Results are
similar when we test on the subject level instead (p= .3520; N=240).
25 Seventy-two subjects in MIXED markets reported having known at least one of the CRT
questions. Including these subjects renders the coefficient of the interaction term CRT ×
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In Specification 1, we reproduce the finding that there is no
statistically significant difference between the profits of traders in
MIXLO and MIXHI. Specification 2 confirms findings from earlier
studies in showing that higher CRT scores are positively related to
higher overall profits for both MIXLO and MIXHI. However, when
we separate this effect by treatment by including an interaction of the
MIXLO dummy with the CRT score, we obtain a larger effect of the
CRT score on profits for MIXHI traders, while for MIXLO traders the
effect of CRT scores on profits is significantly smaller (p<.01) and in
fact cannot be distinguished from zero overall (post-estimation Wald
test; p= .56).
Thus, MIXLO subjects cannot turn advantages in cognitive skills
into higher trading profits. These findings reinforce our earlier results
on trading activity that suggested less deliberate decision-making by
depleted subjects. This suggests an interpretation of trading behavior
of MIXLO participants as relatively more relying on impulsive system 1
processes than on reflective system 2 processes (Kahneman, 2011).26 As
Section 3.4.2 demonstrated that all initial differences in behavior vanish
after the first period, it therefore seems possible that MIXHI subjects,
by imitating MIXLO subjects, might have adapted the use of heuristics
over careful deliberations as the basis to form their trading decisions.
3.6 Increased emotional reactivity
If depleted subjects’ trading patterns were more strongly driven by
impulsive actions or heuristics rather than deliberative processes, it may
be that the treatment also affected their propensity to act based on
emotions. In the experimental sessions that we conducted in November
2015 and October 2017, we asked participants a number of questions
relating to their emotional experience during trading in the asset market.
In particular, we asked participants to rate how strongly they felt a
number of emotions at the beginning of the first period and at the end
of the last period, respectively. We asked participants at the end of the
experiment, requiring them to recollect their emotions.27 In the sessions
conducted in October 2017, we additionally asked participants for their
MIXLO insignificant in the specifications parallel to (3) and (4), as these subjects dilute
the effect.
26 Hefti et al. (2016) argue that good performance in an asset market requires two dimensions
of cognitive capabilities: (1) mentalizing and (2) cognitive abilities. Self-control depletion
could, in principle, affect both dimensions and lead subjects to act impulsively. We deem
this an interesting question for future research.
27 We also provided participants with a questionnaire about their trading behavior, but we
do not report those results here. Table A.6 provides the average responses to all emotion-
related questions and the test statistics. Table A.7 reports average values for changes in
emotions over time.
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Table 3
Determinants of profits in MIXED
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Profit
MIXLO 0.468 0.924 3.803** 3.855**
(0.377) (0.591) (1.776) (1.797)
CRT 0.960** 1.747*** 1.6776***
(0.356) (0.469) (0.508)
CE 0.325 0.607 0.443
(0.426) (0.580) (0.575)
CRT × MIXLO -1.485*** -1.419**
(0.507) (0.531)
CE × MIXLO -0.839 -0.853
(0.843) (0.834)
Female -1.045
(0.634)
Constant 7.766*** 5.723*** 4.617*** 5.689***
(0.189) (0.906) (1.097) (1.288)
Observations 240 137 137 137
R2 .004 .081 .121 .138
Participants who indicated that they knew at least one of the CRT questions are excluded
in Columns 2–4. Robust standard errors are clustered at the market level in parentheses.
*** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1.
emotions directly after the first trading period, to assess whether their
recollection is accurate.
Table 4 reports the results for those emotions that have previously
been connected to overpricing in experimental asset markets (Andrade
et al., 2016; Breaban and Noussair, 2018; Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo,
2011; Lahav and Meer, 2012). Note that we collapse all the emotional
measures on the treatment group level within each market and test
for differences with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. Strikingly, except for
one measure, the intensity of all experienced emotions is higher in
the MIXLO than in the MIXHI group. At the beginning of period
1, MIXLO participants report feeling significantly more joy (p= .097).
Remember that Lahav and Meer (2012) found that inducing positive
mood before trading leads to higher deviations from fundamental values
and thus larger levels of overpricing and that correlational studies
also suggest such a positive relationship (Breaban and Noussair, 2018;
Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo, 2011). Furthermore, at the end of the
final trading period, MIXLO traders report significantly higher levels
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Table 4
Ex post reported emotions of traders in MIXED
MIXHI MIXLO p-value N
A. Beginning of the first period
Excitement 4.088 4.325 .300 16
Fear 2.113 2.200 .717 16
Surprise 3.475 3.813 .168 16
Joy 3.475 3.888 .097* 16
B. End of the last period
Excitement 3.538 4.175 .030** 16
Fear 2.163 2.513 .107 16
Surprise 2.788 3.350 .066* 16
Joy 3.188 3.813 .055* 16
C. Asked after the first period
Excitement 3.925 4.200 .483 8
Fear 2.325 2.475 .833 8
Surprise 2.900 3.350 .056* 8
Joy 2.800 3.275 .140 8
D. Self-evaluation of emotional reactivity
Emotion driven 2.600 2.925 .066* 16
Suppressed emotions 4.913 4.713 .468 16
Data were collapsed on the treatment level per market. Responses are based on a
seven-point Likert scale. Test results are from a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. *** p<.01;
** p<.05; * p<.1.
of excitement, joy and surprise than MIXHI participants (all p<.1;
excitement p<.05; fear p= .107). When asked for their emotions directly
after the first period, subjects also report stronger emotions when self-
control depleted, although only the level of surprise is significantly
higher. The lack of significant differences may be a consequence of the
small sample size for these comparisons (N=8). The general picture,
however, suggests that the emotional experience of the asset market
was different for MIXLO and MIXHI traders.
We also asked participants in the post-experimental questionnaire
explicitly about how strongly they felt their behavior was driven by
emotions and how much they had tried to suppress the influence of
emotions on their trading behavior (see final panel of Table 4). MIXLO
participants report to have acted more emotion driven (p= .066). They
also report lower levels of emotion suppression, but the differences fail
to reach significance at conventional levels. The results indicate that
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the behavior of the traders with depleted self-control might have been
driven by emotional factors to a larger degree than they were themselves
aware of.
The substantially higher level of emotions displayed by MIXLO
participants, combined with their inability to convert cognitive
capacities into higher earnings reported earlier, shows the strong adverse
effects of a reduction in self-control on deliberative decision-making.
In line with our earlier findings on trading activity, depleted subjects
seem to be less able to spend time and resources on thinking about
optimal strategies, but rather relied on quickly available heuristics and
emotional responses. Because the behaviors of depleted and nondepleted
subjects converge quickly, they do not suffer negative consequences from
their actions. Instead, they seem to shift markets onto different price
trajectories.
4. Welfare Implications
We establish a strong effect of reduced self-control on prices, but an
important question remains: is welfare affected? After all, real-life asset
markets exist because trade can be welfare improving.28 In the following,
we discuss how our setting can be informative for markets outside the
laboratory.
First, we think that even a setup using a zero-sum environment can
be informative. Note that under the restrictive assumption of risk-
neutrality, we should not observe any trades. With heterogeneity in risk
preferences (which we observe), however, trade can be welfare improving
if the risk (of the stochastic asset) is transferred from risk-averse to risk-
loving traders. This is exactly one kind of welfare improvement that
real asset markets generate. Technically, trading an asset is only a zero-
sum exchange of money for assets, while the valuations (e.g., because
of different risk profiles) of investors may differ. Therefore, that our
depleted traders trade at higher prices without measurable changes in
risk preferences must be, on average, welfare decreasing if the choices at
higher levels of self-control were optimal. This, we argue, constitutes a
reasonable assumption, given that our findings have shown that depleted
subjects respond more emotionally and therefore less deliberatively.
Second, one could understand the particular experimental asset
market as a partial equilibrium depiction of a real asset market.
Assuming that some investors with market power have information
about the value of the asset while others without market power have not,
prices may then be used as signals by uninformed investors (Fama, 1970;
Grossman, 1976; Radner, 1979; Wolinsky, 1983). Higher prices generated
28 We are very grateful to Wei Jiang and two anonymous referees for raising this question.
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due to a lack of self-control of informed traders could entice other traders
to wrongly invest in inferior assets, thereby harming welfare as more
lucrative options are passed on. This might even happen, as our MIXED
treatment indicates, when only a moderate share of traders is low in
self-control.
To show that uninformed traders actually make wrong investment
choices, we report results from another experiment, conducted in
January 2018. We invited 96 subjects in four sessions to the laboratory
and made them choose repeatedly between an asset with known value
(KVA), and an asset with unknown value (UVA) for which they only
could observe the trading price. In 20 decisions, appearing in random
order for each subject, the UVA’s trading price was simply the average
trading price from each of the 10 periods of our LOWSC and our
HIGHSC treatments. The KVA was always superior to the value
underlying the UVA. In each decision, subjects received 100 points to
distribute among the KVA and the UVA. Subjects were made aware
that the UVA’s price was determined by other human traders who were
informed about the asset’s value.29
We observe that subjects invest on average 58.60 points in the
inferior asset when prices were generated by the traders in the LOWSC
treatment, but only 43.91 points when prices were generated by the
traders in the HIGHSC treatment. This difference is highly significant
according to a Mann-Whitney test (p<.01; N=96). Optimal choices
would have required an investment of 0 points in the UVA; that is, low
self-control traders raise the existing inefficiency by about 33%, which
translates into a welfare reduction. We conclude that excessively high
prices may harm welfare substantially if uninformed traders are present
and follow the strategy that our experimental participants followed.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we provide causal empirical evidence for the notion that
a lack of self-control can fuel overpricing on asset markets. We consider
experimental continuous double auction markets for which Smith et al.
(1988) first reported a tendency for overpricing. We exogenously reduce
market participants’ ability to exert self-control using a tough version
of the Stroop task, which has previously been shown to deplete people’s
ability to exert self-control in subsequent tasks (Baumeister et al., 1998).
When comparing the three market settings in which we reduce the self-
control of either (1) all, (2) half, or (3) none of the traders, we observe
significantly more mispricing and overpricing when at least some traders
are self-control depleted.
29 Section A.7.2 provides instructions, and decisions were incentivized.
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We provide evidence that in markets populated by both, self-control-
depleted and nondepleted traders, initial bidding behavior is different in
the two groups. Depleted subjects bid earlier, suggesting they may not
deliberate as much as nondepleted subjects and seem to rely more on
quickly available heuristics instead. In addition, we have evidence for an
emotional channel that explains our main result. Self-control-depleted
traders show stronger emotions, in general, but in particular stronger
emotions that have been linked to overpricing in previous studies that
induce emotions or that measure emotions while trading. Furthermore,
we find that our measure for cognitive skills loses predictive power
for the profits of low self-control traders. These results are all in line
with a dual systems perspective of self-control: self-control-depleted
participants seem to have acted more on the basis of emotions and
heuristics and less on the basis of cognition, thus driving up prices.
As profits, however, do not differ between depleted and nondepleted
subjects due to quick convergence in behavior, these biases may persist
in markets also outside the experimental laboratory. We discuss that
higher prices may be an issue from a welfare perspective, as they distort
traders’ decisions and may serve as misleading signals for uninformed
buyers.
Our findings have relevant practical implications: First, with
differences in self-control levels, we add a potentially important
explanation to the existing explanations for overpricing on asset
markets. We have shown that already a moderate number of participants
with low self-control is sufficient to more than double the extent of
overpricing in our experiment. If the finding carries over to asset markets
outside the laboratory, this may be problematic in cases in which large
parts of the population engage in stock market trading (e.g., Chinese
markets). If some of these investors suffer from self-control problems, for
whatever reasons, they might be susceptible to using less deliberative
choices and might exacerbate stock market bubbles, even in the presence
of more rational traders.
Second, outside the experimental laboratory, both temporary
reductions in self-control and the personality trait self-control are
supposed to play an important role in determining trading behavior and
perception of market developments. Self-control also might be a relevant
attribute on which individuals self-select into trading. An important
lesson from our results is that low self-control traders might not be
as easily exploitable by high self-control traders as one would think.
In our case, low self-control traders were not driven out of the market
quickly, as they did not suffer negative consequences from their behavior
over our trading periods. Our experiment was not designed to provide
evidence on the exact mechanism that leads to the convergence of
trading strategies of ego-depleted and nondepleted traders. Unveiling
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this mechanism would be important, but the endogeneity in the market
environment makes this a complicated problem. In any case, as our
results suggest that nondepleted traders behave suboptimally in the
presence of depleted traders, it is in the interest of market organizers
to keep low the share of low self-control traders. Mechanisms designed
to filter out traders low in self-control and limiting their market access
could lower aggregate inefficiencies.
Certainly, our findings and policy implications arise in a highly
stylized environment, which is needed to isolate the causal effect of
low self-control on trading behavior. While real markets may have
distinguishing features that could influence the effect of self-control in
both directions—suppression and exacerbation—they also often bear
features common to our setting, such as the double auction market
mechanism, or the decreasing fundamental asset value, which is also
a feature of a large class of assets, such as options, bonds, and
depletable resources. Thus, we think that the effects of low self-control
are relevant in many (but certainly not all) real-world markets unless
other mitigating factors are present.
Our experiment opens up relevant paths for future research: it would
be interesting to see to what extent our results are robust to changes
in alternative market mechanisms, such as call markets, and to changes
in the fundamental value process, such as a constant fundamental value
process, which has been shown to reduce overpricing (Kirchler et al.,
2012). This could generate insights into the robustness of our discoveries
in other settings that are also relevant in practice. Furthermore, our
setting cannot explain why nondepleted subjects adjust their behavior
and are soon indistinguishable statistically from nondepleted subjects.
As already noted, it would be interesting to know if our results carried
through in settings in which this is not the case and under which
circumstances or prerequisites imitation of strategies occurs. Moreover,
we discuss welfare implications of our setting, but our experimental
market does not explicitly allow for welfare variation (in the sense
of being a positive-sum game). We did not implement experiments
that incorporate such a feature, because doing so would have deviated
from the relevant experimental literature on price bubbles and would
have made comparisons much more difficult. However, it would be
interesting to study the effects of self-control depletion on behavior
in positive-sum settings. Finally, the self-control of traders outside the
laboratory remains largely unexplored. Future research could develop
field experiments or use quasi-experimental variations of self-control to
study decisions of traders in real markets.
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